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In Brazil, there is a clear strengthening of debates about the instruments of City Statute, which are discussed under the light of 
social management of land appreciation. Their degree of effectiveness, their low popular participation and their use to 
legitimize policies engendered by particular interests are usually questioned. This paper investigates the capacity of Joint 
Urban Operations as a instrument for surplus land value recovery. Starting from a study on Faria Lima Urban Operation, 
limitations and opportunities of Linha Verde Urban Operation (Curitiba-PR), which is being implemented, is prospectively 
discussed. Analysis performed came up with observations that were, at the same time, complementary and contradictory. On 
one hand, it is necessary to recognize urban operation’s potential as an instrument able to leverage urban transformation, 
dividing costs of public action among other stakeholders. On the other hand, however, its low efficiency – from the perspective 
of social management of land appreciation – is clear, and shows a lack of mechanisms that could ensure a minimal addressing 
of the funds for constructions of public interest. 
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INTRODUCTION 1 
Certain urban actions and decisions taken and 
made by the government – such as 
implementation of infrastructure and public 
facilities or changes in urban legislation – 
leverage land value. Thus, a public action, whose 
costs are spread throughout society, results in 
benefits for a few private owners. In this context, 
mechanisms for social management of land 
appreciation acquire a major role, enabling 
government to recover surplus land values, 
redistributing to community the land appreciation 
resulted from their actions (Smolka, Amborski, 
2000, Furtado, 2004, Santoro, Cymbalista, 2004). 
In Brazil, significant advances have been achieved 
in this field since 2001, when Federal Law No. 
10.257/2001, known as the City Statute, 
established “rules of public policies and social 
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interest that rule the use of urban property in favor 
of collective well, safety and welfare of citizens, as 
well as environmental balance” (Article 1, Author 
translation). For Piza, Santoro and Cymbalista 
(2004), City Statute consolidates State’s duty on 
promoting the fair distribution of urbanization 
onus and benefits among whole society, 
recovering resulting appreciation of public 
constructions in order to accomplish the social 
function of city.  
Among the instruments defined in Law 
10.257/2001, this paper focuses its discussion 
on  Joint Urban Operation, “one of the most 
controversial instruments of the City Statute”, in 
the words of Cymbalista and Santoro (2008). As 
authors construes, Joint Urban Operation (UO) 
can be understood as an instrument to redesign 
certain urban areas through modifications in 
parameters of land use and occupation, combi-
ning public and private investments (obtained 
by selling of building rights) in order to 
implement an urban plan. The resulting funds 
of counterpart are directed to a unique account 
for each Urban Operation, and have to be used 
only for achievement interventions defined by 
law, within its perimeter. 
According to its defenders, Joint Urban Operation 
lets the beneficiaries of a construction pay for its 
costs, freeing up public resources, so that they 
can be used in priority investments; and allow the 
recovery of so-called “surplus land value”, by 
capturing part of the appreciation resulted from a 
public investment in a way that it is not 
appropriated only by owners and real estate 
developers (Fix, 2004). 
Considering that instruments of urban policy must 
follow all guidelines outlined in City Statute 
(Santoro, Cymbalista, 2004), and thus enable 
social management of land appreciation, this 
paper intends to investigate the extent of Joint 
Urban Operation as a mechanism of urban 
surplus land value capture. In Brazil, its 
application dates back to the early 1990s, 
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adopted by the city of São Paulo, a pioneer. 
However, many implementation problems were 
encountered due to fragility of operation at the 
time, leading to a series of questionings by 
public agencies (Sepe, Pereira, 2011). 
After City Statute, in 2001, a set of general rules 
was established for Joint Urban Operations, 
ensuring legal security for its implementation by 
local governments. The law created the 
Certificates of Additional Building Rights (In 
Portuguese: certificados de potencial adicional de 
construção - CEPACs): real estate bonds issued 
by City Hall and sold in São Paulo Stock Market 
Exchange (BMF&Bovespa), a sale mechanism 
that works as a counterpart for the selling of 
additional building rights acquired by developers. 
In other words, they can be understood as a finan-
cial mechanism that enable to purchase more 
floor area ratio than established in zoning law, 
converting square meters into financial quotas. 
In Brazil, there are only two cases of Joint Urban 
Operations (UO) implemented with issuance of 
CEPACs bonds so far (both in São Paulo), and 
another in implementation process (in Rio de 
Janeiro). Bearing in mind the reduced number of 
cases, it can be stated that the adoption of this 
financial engineering mechanism is still an 
ongoing learning opportunity in the country, 
whose dissonances and contradictions must be 
understood in order to mitigate them when setting 
up new Urban Operations. 
In this context, we highlight the creation of Linha 
Verde [Green Line] Urban Operation in Curitiba, 
fourth in Brazil with CEPACs bonds. Known as the 
largest Brazilian Urban Operation (4,475,000 
square meters of additional building potential), 
its implementation is still very recent (its 
regulatory decree was sanctioned only on 
January 26, 2012). 
Given the above, this paper seeks to discuss the 
Linha Verde Urban Operation limits and its 
potential in Brazilian scenario, aiming to 
contribute to further discussion of Joint Urban 
Operations as a instrument for social management 
of land appreciation. The following issues were 
raised: what are the main structural elements of 
Linha Verde urban operation? Do these factors 
hinder or promote surplus value recovery?  
An effort was made to understand previously 
experiences in national scenario, in order to 
establish a comparative parallel, enriching the 
discussion.  
The experience in Rio de Janeiro (Porto Maravilha 
UO - Municipal Law No. 101/2009) was left out 
due to its early implementation process. In São 
Paulo, however, there is a historical trajectory of 
implementation of Joint Urban Operations, whose 
legal provision dates back to 1985 Master Plan 
and its implementation at the 1990s. Between 
São Paulo’s urban Operations with CEPACS, Faria 
Lima UO was defined as complementary study 
case, selected in a non-probabilistic and inten-
tional way, primarily considering two aspects: 
(I) the greater volume of financial compensation 
resources involved and (II) because there was an 
issuance of CEPACs in a second step of Urban 
Operation implementation (post City Statute), 
which allows to verify any transformation 
engendered by modifications in the way additional 
building rights are commercialized. 
A SYNTHETIC ANALYSIS OF FARIA 
LIMA URBAN OPERATION 
The first initiative to create Faria Lima Urban 
Operation (UO) dates back to 1991, when 
Municipal Strategic Master Plan was being 
developed. Later, in 1993, the UO was forwarded 
to City Council as a bill, approved in 1995 (Sepe, 
Pereira, 2011). 
Instituted by Law No. 11.732/1995, Faria Lima 
UO focused in an area defined for a road system 
connection between Brigadeiro Faria Lima 
Avenue and Pedroso de Moraes Avenue, 
foreseeing improvements in road system, social 
housing and social equipments (Montandon, 
2007). In a critical view, Sandroni (2001) 
summarizes Faria Lima’s UO as a strategy to 
extent an avenue that was not priority in terms of 
circulation and traffic, on whose land value was 
one of the highest of São Paulo.  
Its implementation can be divided into two stages: 
the first one preceding City Statute, and another, 
in which revisions were made in order to adapt it 
to new Brazilian legal framework. In the first stage, 
perimeter of the Urban Operation was divided into 
Directly Benefited Area (DBA), referring to the 
parcel directly benefited by extension of Faria 
Lima Avenue, and Indirectly Benefited Area (IBA). 
The purchase of additional building rights 
happened through presentation of projects by the 
owners, from which São Paulo City hall calculated 
the compensation value to be paid for each 
building individually.  
According to Alvim, Abascal and Moraes 
(2011), capture of counterparts proved to be a 
sluggish process, in which buildings were 
settled long before required infrastructures were 
constructed. In addition, the adopted model for 
compensations valuation lacked legal ground, 
generating serious questionings by supervisory 
and controlling boards. 
After City Statute approval (Law 10.257/2001), 
São Paulo City Hall reviewed Faria Lima UO in 
2003, changing financial engineering and 
adopting CEPAC’s logic. Thus, since Municipal 
Law nº. 13.769/2004 (amended by Law 
13.871/2004), São Paulo City Hall started issuing 
CEPACs bonds for selling additional building 
rights. A CEPACs conversion table in additional 
square meters was created, with different values 
for commercial and residential uses, reducing 
subjectivity in the financial contribution 
calculation (Sepe, Pereira, 2011).  
Four sectors (and 18 subsectors) were created to 
replace areas directly and indirectly benefited and 
the stock of residual additional square meters 
(1.281.908,54 m²) was converted into 650,000 
CEPACs (sold for a minimum price per unit of 
$ 591,40
1)).  The adopted criteria involve infra-
structure capacity, architectural typological-
pattern and existing land use.  
Until October 2011, city hall had already sold 
635.059 CEPACs (97.7% of total amount), 
collecting more than $  634 million – 526,684 
were already converted into buildings and 
110.875 are still outstanding in financial market 
(SP-Urbanismo, 2011). It is necessary to 
highlight the recent approval by City Council of 
São Paulo, in December 2011, of an additional 
issuing of 500,000 CEPACs in Faria Lima UO, 
generating estimated revenue of $ 1,07 billion. 
 
 
        Figure 1. Faria Lima UO Perimeter (stage 1),Source: adapted from Montandon (2007). Neto P. N., Moreira T. A.: Urban policy in Brazil: Mismatches in the social management of land appreciation 
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Based on the analysis of another studies about 
this urban operation (Sepe, Pereira, 2011, Sales, 
2005, Montandon, 2007; Fix, 2001), it was clear 
that there is an uneven distribution of benefits of 
urban interventions, confirming the classic 
mismatch between theoretical framework of urban 
planning and the practice of urban management, 
as extensively discussed by Maricato (2000). 
Indeed, Faria Lima UO is far from being strong as 
an instrument for surplus value capture, 
contributing, in fact, to strengthen an exclusionary 
model of urban development, which concentrates 
resources and opportunities in restricted areas 
and in favor of certain groups. This process led to 
a fast land appreciation in a noble area of the city, 
hampering investments in social housing and 
land use diversification suggested by the UO (Fix, 
2004, Sepe, Pereira, 2011, Sales, 2005, 
Montandon, 2007). 
It is interesting to notice that the stock acquire was 
concentrated, between 1995 and 2004, in 
Indirectly Benefited Area (IBA) - accounting for 
59.61% of acquired additional building rights - 
demonstrating the inability of Urban Operation in 
leveraging the densification along the extension of 
Faria Lima Avenue (DBA), where the largest 
amount of additional building rights was offered 
(1.25 million m² - 56% of total). 
We can observe an increased interest of real 
estate sector in Vila Olímpia district (IBA), an area 
traditionally occupied by medium density single 
family housings, where direct investments in 
improvements have not been carried out, and 
where there has been occurred intensive 
replacement of existing buildings by large 
commercial ones (Sepe, Pereira, 2011). These 
new centralities expose a contradiction: districts 
with higher land appreciation are the same that 
have lost the greater amount of resident 
population. Direct public investment has 
intensified real estate activity, but failed in 
obtaining appropriated urban and social 
development (Montandon, 2007). 
Faria Lima UO obtained, as a main result, the 
gentrification
2) of an already elitist area of the city, 
where, from a "magical formula of partnership", a 
public investment cycle for real estate market has 
been legitimized and formally justified by the 
need for infrastructure funding (Fix, 2004). 
Although the second stage of urban operation has 
shown advances, it is still unable to break the 
capitalist logic of space production that combines 
high building density detached from population 
density, investments in road system closely 
related to real estate interests and low investment 
in social housing (Montando, 2007). 
LINHA VERDE URBAN OPERATION – 
CURITIBA – PR 
BR-116 Federal Highway is the main road in 
Brazil, connecting the whole country lengthwise. 
In Curitiba, it crosses the city, dividing it into two 
parts, creating transposition difficulties and an 
intense conflict between urban traffic and load 
traffic (Figure 3.). According to Souza (2001), 
problems generated by the intersection 
between BR-116 and urban grid are objects of 
City Hall’s concern since the Preliminary Urban 
Plan (PUP) in 1965, when the urban 
occupation even had not overtaken the so-
called BR-2 (Figure 4.). 
With the construction of an alternative road to 
divert load traffic from urban stretch of the 
highway, the City Hall could urbanize an important 
route that connect Curitiba and its metropolitan 
area, passing through 23 neighborhoods and 
polarizing urban growth in eastern portion of the 
city (Machuca, 2010).  
 
Figure  2– Faria Lima UO Perimeter (Stage 2), Source: adapted from SEPE and PEREIRA (2011). 
 
 
Figure 3. BR 116 Axis – current urban grid, Source: adapted from IPPUC (2011). 
 
 
Figure 4. BR 116 Axis – PUP, Source: adapted from Souza (2001). Neto P. N., Moreira T. A.: Urban policy in Brazil: Mismatches in the social management of land appreciation 
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Despite lengthy negotiations with federal 
government to grant the stretch - that lasted over a 
decade - the project, even with some 
modifications, maintained its principle from the 
beginning: construct an intercity and metropolitan 
integration axis, adapting the road system, 
changing land use and occupation (originally 
occupied by sheds and factories) and the type of 
predominant traffic (Moura, 2011). 
The urbanization process, focused on the road 
system adequacy and implantation of the new 
public transportation axis, started in 2007, 
consuming $  86.5 million only in the southern 
section (Figures 5. and 6.). Changes in zoning, 
made in 2008
3), intensified real estate dynamics 
in neighboring area, where was observed 
appreciation in land of over 70% in some places 
(Secovi, Rios, 2009). 
Analyzing preliminary results, Machuca (2010), 
Hardt, Chu and Hardt (2009) identified a trend 
(even if slow) of transformation in land use and 
occupation, with gradual replacement of existing 
use for residential buildings and local 
commercial enterprises.  
In order to leverage urban transformation in 
bordering areas of Linha Verde axis, Curitiba City 
Hall proposed the Linha Verde Urban 
Operation (UO). The bill, sent to City Council in 
October 2011, was endorsed by Mayor Luciano 
Ducci in December 2011, creating Law No. 
13.909/2011, regulated by Decree No. 133/2012. 
Modeled according to CEPACs systematic, Linha 
Verde UO aims to raise funds for complete 
construction of the road and transportation 
system, urban redevelopment, creation of public 
spaces and land regularization, promoting an 
urban occupation with diversification of uses (in 
accordance to proposed zoning), assisting the 
population in vulnerable situation and improving 
road system and urban and environmental quality 
of the intervention area (Curitiba, 2011). 
The urban operation perimeter was divided into 
three sections (North, Central and South), which 
were then subdivided into three sub-sectors, with 
different densities, possibilities of verticalization 
and allowed uses (Figure 7.). Linha Verde UO 
provides a total supply of 4,475,000  m² of 
additional building area (split unevenly among 
sectors and uses), which will be converted into up 
to 4,830,000 CEPACs, with a minimum sale price 
of $ 107,52
4) (Curitiba, 2011).  
A controversial point of Linha Verde Urban 
Operation is its institutional management 
framework. Our questionings involve two 
elements considered fundamental in discussions 
about urban operation as an instrument for social 
management of land appreciation. 
The first one refers to the elaboration of the urban 
project, the priority  constructions plan and the 
environmental impact study of urban operation. As 
 
 
Figure 5. Linha Verde – total length), Source: IPPUC (2010). 
 
 
Figure 6. Project Cost per Stretch, Source: adapted from Cabral (2011) 
 
Figure 7. Linha Verde Urban Operation – sectors delimitation,                                                     
Source: adapted from Curitiba (2011). Neto P. N., Moreira T. A.: Urban policy in Brazil: Mismatches in the social management of land appreciation 
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stated in Curitiba Master Plan (Law 
11.266/2004), in accordance with City Statute 
(Federal Law no. 10.257/01), a joint urban 
operation law must contain the following 
minimum elements: delimitation of the 
intervention area; purpose of the urban operation; 
basic programs for area occupation and 
interventions; study on the impact in the 
neighborhood; economic and social programs 
directed towards population directly affected; 
counterparts to owners, permanent users and 
private investors; the way to control the operation, 
which must includes civil society representatives 
(Curitiba, 2004). 
Law no.13.909/2011, which approved Linha 
Verde Urban Operation, relegated to a later stage 
the elaboration of Priority Interventions Plan 
(art.19), Urban Plan and Project (art. 20) and the 
environmental impact study, contradicting 
Municipal Law no. 11.266/2004, which was 
supposed to be ruling it. In addition, although the 
economic and social program was mentioned as 
one of the general objectives of Linha Verde UO, 
mechanisms that would make it work are not 
provided and the elements that compose it are not 
even defined. 
Far from putting into question the expertise of 
these documents (largely of IPPUC’s respon-
sibility), the question here is the lack of popular 
participation in the formulation process. And even 
if there was participation, how could the public 
evaluate a urban intervention project that does not 
have a clearly delineated action plan, nor a clear 
definition of environmental, social and economic 
impacts involved and their mitigation measures?
5) 
This question leads us to a second question on 
how to manage Linha Verde Urban Operation, 
namely: the low representation of civil society on 
its implementation process. Law no. 13.909/2011 
establishes a management group that would 
implement and monitor the Intervention Program 
of Joint Urban Operation. 
Coordinated by the Curitiba Research and Urban 
Planning Consultancy (IPPUC - Instituto de 
Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbano de Curitiba), 
this group consists of eleven members, with the 
following board: Municipal Urbanism Office; 
Municipal Finances Office; Municipal 
Administration Office; Municipal Environment 
Department; Municipal Government Office; 
Curitiba Research and Urban Planning 
Consultancy (IPPUC); Curitiba City Hall; Paraná’s 
Civil Construction Industry Syndicate – 
SINDUSCON; Paraná Housing and Condominium 
Union - SECOVI Paraná; Paraná’s Real Estate 
Companies Directors Association – ADEMI; City 
Council of Curitiba – CONCITIBA. 
If we analyze the Management Group board, 
which should apparently involve the participation 
of "representing entities of the civil society" 
(Curitiba, 2011, art. 18), a concentration of 
municipal government entities (7 - 63.4%) and 
institutions related to housing market (3 - 27.3%) 
becomes evident. Thus, civil society is left with 
only one member in the management group, 
represented by CONCITIBA. The situation gets 
worse when we consider the various questions 
about the legitimacy of CONCITIBA (Silva et al., 
2011; TDD, 2010; CED, 2011), which does not 
have a significant representation of civil society 
organizations. Going along with the existence of 
popular participation in the implementation of the 
Linha Verde UO becomes hard to endure. 
In addition, it is interesting to notice the 
composition of Executive Committee of the 
Intervention Program, which is responsible for 
defining the Priority Intervention Plan and the 
Linha Verde Urban Operation Investment Program. 
The Executive Committee is composed by six 
representatives of municipal boards (the same 
that make up the manager group), which, alone, 
represents more than 50% of management group 
and therefore could approve by themselves by 
majority rule the plans they came up with. Also, 
even if they didn’t hold the majority of votes, the 
negotiations within the management group would 
be centered between the government and entities 
related to the housing market, keeping away those 
who should be prioritized by resources obtained 
through CEPACs: community.  
Bearing in mind the experience of Faria Lima UO, 
discussed in the previous chapter, this paper 
must inquire about Linha Verde UO’s limited role 
as an instrument for social management of land 
appreciation. If we include this scenario in the 
intense lobbying engendered by real estate 
market (which, by the way, has significant 
representation in the management group) and by 
the contractors focused on public constructions, 
we can raise the hypothesis that the Linha Verde 
UO is closer to a mechanism of boosting housing 
m a r k e t  t h a n  t o  a n  i n s t r u m e n t  o f  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  
social function of the city and of the property (as 
provided by City Statute). 
In this sense, Piza, Santoro and Cymbalista 
(2004) warn that the implementation of a Joint 
Urban Operation without an adequate social 
management of the resources involved 
undoubtedly leads to the definition of priorities "of 
a few" over the community interests. In fact, Urban 
Operations conducted improperly tend to 
maximize excluding effects of contemporary 
urbanization
6), once it concentrates on singular 
intervention actions that do not add real con-
tributions to the society (Alvim et al., 2011). 
City Hall tends to invest on constructions called 
"anchor" of the urban operation, justified by the 
doubtful necessity of attracting “private equity” 
that could stimulate a process of wider urban 
renewal. Thus, the government plays the role of a 
real estate development company, a business 
potential brake-releaser in a certain region (Fix, 
2004). Therefore, Joint Urban Operation can be 
understood as an effective mechanism adopted to 
cover the logic of urban income concentration, 
legitimizing the targeting of significant public 
resources to infra-structured areas and restricted 
benefits constructions, leading the government to 
assume a central role in boosting private 
accumulation (and not recovery, as one might 
suppose) of urban surplus land value. 
FINAL REMARKS 
For decades, land appreciation capture generated 
by public investment has been discussed and 
pursued in Brazil. Among the various tributaries 
and urban instruments provided by City Statute, 
Joint Urban Operation certainly represents one of 
the most controversial and contradictory. 
Although one cannot deny the great potential of 
Joint Urban Operations as a instrument to 
leverage urban transformations - sharing the costs 
of public action – its disarticulation (intentional or 
merely reckless) with other urban instruments 
tends to reduce its power as a instrument for 
social management of land appreciation, gene-
rating conflicts between the different stakeholders 
involved and resulting in projects sometimes 
detached from the social dimension. In fact, plans 
and programs displaced from social policies tend 
to settle the basic substrate for continuity of 
political patronage, a traditional characteristic of 
Latin-American public management. 
Based on Maricato and Ferreira’s (2002) 
statement, for who the application or 
interpretation of the laws in Brazil usually 
depends on the circumstances, one could 
speculate about the predominance of interests of 
social groups with more influence, which have 
greater ability to influence decisions related to 
municipal urban policy. 
We can even question the role of the Certificates 
of Additional Building Rights (CEPACs), which, 
even though allow the government to capture 
quickly and in advance the resources from the 
private sector, can also be understood as 
subordinator elements of urban policy for the 
housing market, converting it into an additional 
source of financial speculation. 
Another critical issue of Joint Urban Operations 
concerns the restriction of investments within 
the perimeter of intervention, understood by 
many authors as a limit to the social function of 
the city, once considerable resources are 
reinvested in infra-structured areas, leveraging Neto P. N., Moreira T. A.: Urban policy in Brazil: Mismatches in the social management of land appreciation 
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land appreciation and exacerbating socio-
territorial inequalities. 
Despite the many contradictions inherent to the 
process of formulation and implementation of 
Joint Urban Operations in Brazil, it is believed 
that if these operations possess consistent 
mechanisms of democratic and participatory 
management, it would be possible to mitigate 
the risk of the prevalence of private interests. On 
the other hand, however, the cases studied in 
this paper point out the very low representation 
of civil society throughout the process, which is 
poorly even consulted about the approval of an 
urban operation. 
Although the results are not deep enough to 
support the defense of a hypothesis, we risk to 
conclude this paper speculating about the lack of 
Joint Urban Operations in promoting social 
management of land appreciation by themselves. 
It’s important to note that this paper tries to 
contribute to the investigation about the tools for 
recovery surplus land value, adding support for 
further discussion on theoretical and empirical 
questions, with no intention of ending the 
discussions on the theme. 
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1) Monetary values in this paper were converted from reais 
(Brazilian currency unit) to U.S. dollars based on quotation 
of May, 24, 2011 (US $ 1,00 – R$ 1,86).    
2) Although there are a large number of definitions for the 
term gentrification, they all understand it as a physical 
improvement of old neighborhoods where the poorer 
population move out and more affluent population moving 
into it. (Lukić, 2011). 
3) Law no. 12.767/2008 established building incentives for 
land situated in the area covered by Linha Verde project. 
4) Initial revenue estimative is approximately of $ 806,4 
million (Sinduscon, 2011). 
5)  It is worth mentioning that even among the council 
members, upon the approval of the bill in City Council, there 
were fierce debates regarding the lack of information about 
the impacts and mitigation measures related to Linha Verde 
Urban Operation (CMC, 2011). 
6) As Mazza (2010, p. 3) states, “the political nature of 
spatial planning activities is linked to their redistributive 
character and to the mechanism of exclusion and inclusion 
that follows from this. The main effects of planning practices 
are therefore political and social, rather than economic and 
spatial”. 
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